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Abstract — This paper provides an overview on the most 
relevant legal, ethical and social implications arising from the use 
of computational intelligence based systems for land border 
crossings. Based on the automatic deception detection system 
(ADDS) developed in the iBorderCtrl project, issues such as the 
peculiarities of the interaction of humans with machines, 
profiling, automated decision-making and the risk of false 
positives can be identified and demonstrate how computational 
intelligence based systems can challenge fundamental legal and 
ethical principles. These include in particular the right to 
privacy, human dignity and the principle of non-discrimination. 
By further analysing the various issues, this paper seeks to 
provide some thoughts on remedies and safeguards which should 
be considered when developing computational intelligence based 
systems. 
Keywords — Law, Ethics, Fundamental Rights, Data 
Protection, Privacy, Computational Intelligence, Border Control 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The use of computational intelligence based systems is 
becoming more and more important from a practical point of 
view. These systems are not only capable of interacting with 
human beings, but also to decide on certain questions based on 
the input provided by an end-user and the underlying 
algorithm. To utilise these technologies, the EU-funded 
iBorderCtrl project [1] is currently developing a system to 
enhance the quality of border checks [2]. One particular aspect 
of this system is the use of an avatar interview with the 
traveller and deception detection technology, called 
“Automatic Deception Detection System” (ADDS): For an 
initial risk assessment regarding the traveller, a system for 
non-verbal behaviour analysis is being developed to detect 
whether a traveller is lying. The following article will first 
describe and analyse the technology developed in the course 
of iBorderCtrl as a possible use-case for computational 
intelligence based systems and then give an overview on the 
various legal, ethical and social implications. Following the 
results of iBorderCtrl as an European research project, the 
article will focus primarily on European legal sources. In 
general, rules on border crossings can be found in the various 
national legislations. It can be further refined by bilateral 
treaties. However, there is no statutory framework which 
could be applied on international level. From a privacy point 
of view, Convention 108 of the Council of Europe is the only 
viable global agreement, imposing minimum standards for 
privacy [3]. However, European rules on data protection might 
increasingly develop towards a standard even outside of the 
European Union, due to their widespread adoption by 
countries throughout the world enacting some or all of these 
rules [3]. 
II. DATA COLLECTION 
A. The iBorderCtrl ADDS technology 
The ADDS used in iBorderCtrl can be seen as a computational 
intelligence based system, as it interacts with human beings 
and analyses their behaviour. ADDS utilises a hierarchy of 
artificial neural networks which inform a deception score of a 
traveller whilst undertaking an avatar based interview. It is 
embedded in a two-stage process:  
In a first stage, a traveller is asked to provide information 
concerning his/her person and the travel details. This 
information is being checked against various databases to 
determine whether the preconditions for crossing a border are 
met. Timewise, this step is detached from the border crossing, 
meaning that a traveller can pre-register a few days before the 
actual travel is scheduled. In order to verify whether the 
information provided by the traveller is correct, the traveller 
will be interviewed by a virtual avatar of a border guard in the 
pre-registration phase. The questions asked during the 
interview are based on the information registered by the 
system prior to the interview. By analysing the non-verbal 
communication of the traveller, the system verifies whether 
the information provided in the pre-registration was correct or 
whether there is a risk that the person made false statements in 
the pre-registration phase. Once the first stage is completed 
successfully, the traveller is allowed to approach the border 
crossing point, where an actual border check is being 
conducted by the border guards, which is supplemented – 
among other things – by the results of the avatar interview. 
To achieve this, the system observes non-verbal behaviour 
(so-called micro-gestures) while a traveller is being 
interviewed. Such observations can be semi-automatically 
analysed to quantify the likelihood of deceptive behaviour, i.e. 
false statements given by an interviewee. The system shall not 
only serve as an electronic aide to a human border agent, but 
shall be able to collect data autonomously by 
“communicating” directly with the travellers. Such 
communication shall be handled by a personalised avatar that 
will be created for each traveller. In addition, the avatar shall 
be capable of improving performance and accuracy as 
compared to human border guards, as it shall be able to 
individually adapt to each traveller’s profile. Based on the data 
available on each traveller, this shall not only enable the 
iBorderCtrl ADDS to raise specific interview topics that are of 
higher relevance for certain travellers but may be irrelevant for 
others. All in all, the system will interact with the traveller 
autonomously by deciding on which questions to ask, how to 
behave (i.e. the avatar can adapt its behaviour to the behaviour 
of the traveller, such as acting rather sceptical if an answer 
seems to be not correct) and finally to assess the overall risk 
stemming from the traveller based on the information 
provided in the pre-registration phase and the results of the 
deception detection. This risk assessment will be delivered to 
the border guards, assisting them in their decisions during the 
actual border check in stage 2 on whether a person is allowed 
to cross the border, or if a thorough check might be required. 
B. Impact of human-machine interaction 
The interaction between humans and machines is an integral 
part of the ADDS system and the avatar interview. The 
purpose of those functionalities is to shift certain elements of 
the border check from the border crossing phase to the pre-
registration, and, in consequence, from an interaction between 
border guards and travellers - both as human beings - to an 
interaction with a computer avatar. Neither the use of such 
technology nor guidelines regarding the interaction of humans 
and machines with regard to border checks are incorporated in 
the current legal system.  
According to Article 7 Schengen Borders Code (SBC) [4], 
border guards shall, in the performance of their duties, fully 
respect human dignity, in particular in cases involving 
vulnerable persons. Additionally, Article 16 SBC stipulates 
that Member States shall ensure that the border guards are 
specialised and properly trained professionals, taking into 
account common core curricula for border guards [5]. These 
training curricula shall include specialised training for 
detecting and dealing with situations involving vulnerable 
persons, such as unaccompanied minors and victims of 
trafficking. If certain aspects of the border check are not being 
performed by border guards, but by an avatar, the principle of 
respecting the dignity of travellers is being challenged, as 
human dignity may be violated in multiple ways. In general, 
aside from the most obvious examples of a violation of human 
dignity such as torture [6], exposing people to inhuman 
treatment [5], slavery and bonded labour [7], there may also 
be cases where an interference with human dignity is less 
obvious and where a violation of human dignity may have 
numerous facets and dimensions, for example humiliation, 
degradation or ostracism against a person [8]. Furthermore, a 
person may not be “dehumanized”, that refers to an act with 
which individuals or groups are stripped of their human 
characteristics or treated as less valued human beings [9]. 
Human dignity may also be violated by degradation, where the 
inherent value of a human being is deprecated [10]. 
These requirements very much reflect the concerns that arise 
when performing border checks: Both the behaviour of border 
guards as well as the measures performed during a border 
check have to fully respect human dignity. To this extent, the 
importance of decisions for the person as an individual, such 
as access or refusal, as well as the intensity of checks on 
privacy have to be considered. Consequently, with regard to 
the avatar interview, a variety of issues arise, which – on an 
abstract level – can be also transposed to the use of 
computational based intelligence systems in general. 
C. Degradation of the traveller to an object 
By having an interview with a computer avatar instead of a 
border guard, the traveller will be faced with a rather unusual 
environment: In fact, an interaction between humans and 
machines cannot be found in any other area of daily life 
currently. While there are certain approaches to facilitate the 
use of ICT-technology in certain areas, such as the 
consultation of a medical doctor via a webcam [11], there is 
still a human being actively involved in the process.  
In order to fully understand the implication that arises from 
replacing human interaction with machine interaction, it is 
important to show the actual difference. Computer software 
usually follows a set of rules, specifying how the software 
should behave in certain situations. However, it is currently 
not possible to properly assess every detail in every situation. 
Therefore, computer software is not able to adapt to a situation 
in the same way a human being could. Non-typical situations 
therefore can be seen as a particular challenge for 
computational intelligence based systems, as providing rules 
for every possible situation appears to be impossible at this 
point in time, while the emotional needs of human beings 
should always be respected. This being said, various legal and 
ethical implications, particularly with human dignity, can 
arise, as the following examples show: 
• If a person feels bad or starts crying, how could 
software adapt to this situation? Even if the avatar 
would be able to detect such behaviour, it would not be 
able to actually help the person by calming him or her 
down, as opposed to a human being (such as a border 
guard) who would have far more options to interact 
with the person.  
• If a traveller is not able to properly reply to a question, 
e.g. because there is a non-typical situation which is not 
covered by the procedure which the software has to 
follow, people could feel helpless and/or uncomfortable 
as opposed to interacting with a human being, who 
could adapt to the situation and provide guidance. 
• Software might not be able to detect misunderstandings; 
if a traveller misunderstands a question and 
consequently gives a wrong reply, the software might 
assume that the person is lying rather than having just 
not understood the question correctly.  
• As the avatar will also adjust its behaviour according to 
the behaviour of the traveller, wrong interpretations of 
the software could cause the avatar to react in a way 
which appears to be strange, frightening or inhuman to 
the traveller. 
In addition, due to the technical nature of the avatar, a 
conversation would have to follow certain rules. In order to 
allow the software to properly process the answers, questions 
might have to be asked in a specific way in order to receive 
the answer in a specific format. The wording of those 
questions could appear to be strange to travellers, therefore 
reducing the social acceptance of such technologies.  
This obviously poses difficult ethical challenges with regard to 
human dignity. The avatar interview should therefore seek to 
implement safeguards which ensure that situations as outlined 
above cannot occur.  
It has to be noted though, that the ethical implications might 
change once the use of computational intelligence based 
systems is more common and people are used to interact with 
machines, as this could reduce inherent fears and 
uncertainties. 
D. Avatar “behavior” and questions asked 
during the avatar interview  
The questions raised during the avatar interview, from a legal 
point of view, have to be seen as data processing, as the 
answers of the traveller will be collected, recorded and further 
analysed as outlined in the following chapters. Following the 
principles stipulated in Article 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), a 
statutory legal basis or consent of the traveller would be 
required in order to collect and process data [12]. The purpose 
of the ADDS system as outlined above is to shift the interview 
border guards would perform during a border-check to the pre-
registration phase by using a virtual police avatar. This poses 
various legal and ethical concerns. 
Firstly, on content-level [13], it has to be ensured that the 
questions would still serve their purpose – for instance, 
questions arising from the requirement to protect public health 
might not be feasible if asked several days before the actual 
border crossing. Asking unnecessary questions would violate 
the right to privacy [14]. 
Secondly, the overall format of the avatar interview should not 
violate the cultural or religious feelings of travellers. 
Therefore, it needs to be carefully assessed how border guards 
are trained to specifically respect cultural and religious 
feelings of travellers by adapting their behaviour accordingly. 
This could, for instance, cover questions such as the gender of 
the avatar (a female traveller should be interviewed by a 
female avatar and vice versa), a certain dress code, or certain 
habits, such as how to salute a person. Therefore, the avatar 
would have to be adapted for every interview not only based 
on the information provided by the traveller, but also based on 
his/her cultural background and religion. Adapting the avatar 
to every traveller individually would also help to ensure that 
the travellers does not feel to be treated like an object, but 
rather as an individual human being. In fact, it could be even 
seen as an advantage of a virtual avatar that it can change its 
appearance according to the needs of the traveller, as opposed 
to a human border guard. 
III. DATA PROCESSING 
A. Profiling 
With regard to data processing, a peculiarity of computational 
intelligence based systems is that they rely on processing 
different kinds of data. As a matter of fact, this data also has to 
be collected, but the main impact on privacy arises from the 
processing aspect. From a legal point of view, this technique 
could be seen as profiling: ‘Profiling’ means any form of 
automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of 
personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to 
a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects 
concerning that natural person's performance at work, 
economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, 
reliability, behaviour, location or movements [15]. This most 
probably applies to the majority of computational intelligence 
based systems - with regard to the ADDS system developed in 
iBorderCtrl, the collection and processing of different forms of 
personal data (i.e. micro gestures and behavioural aspects) for 
the purpose of deception detection can be seen as profiling.  
From a legal point of view, profiling poses a variety of risks: 
Due to the nature of profiling, the collection of different kinds 
of personal data is required. While the collection of personal 
data in itself is already subject to certain restrictions (e.g. 
requires a legal basis or consent of the data subject and 
compliance with the principles of processing personal data), 
the concentration of different categories of data of a person in 
the hands of one data controller may cause a severe intrusion 
into the privacy of a data subject [16]. 
Profiling, therefore, is subject to specific legislation. For a 
use-case such as proposed by iBorderCtrl, Directive 
680/2016/EU would apply, as the scope of the Directive (art. 
2) covers the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes outlined in art. 1, which includes 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
including the safeguarding against and the prevention of 
threats to public security. According to recital 6 of the 
Schengen Border Code (Regulation 399/2016), border control 
should help to, among others, prevent any threat to the 
Member States’ internal security, which would be within the 
subject-matter of Directive 680/2016/EU [17]. It has to be 
noted that in the current legal framework there is no legal 
basis for using an avatar interview such as the iBorderCtrl 
ADDS system. However, a legal basis could be enacted based 
on the principles and rules outlined in Directive 680/2016/EU. 
For data processing within the scope of Directive 
680/2016/EU, the general principles relating to processing of 
personal data as outlined in article 4 have to be considered. 
These include that personal data has to be processed lawfully 
and fairly, collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes, and the processing has to adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed [18]. Therefore, computational intelligence based 
systems have to be designed bearing in mind that only data 
which can be utilized for the desired purpose is being 
processed.   
Apart from that, article 11 of Directive 680/2016/EU prohibits 
profiling in general, unless appropriate safeguards are applied. 
A particular risk that might arise within the iBorderCtrl ADDS 
is the different criteria that will be considered for assessing the 
individual risk score assigned to each traveller. As outlined in 
this section, it is important to ensure that these risk indicators 
do not discriminate against certain groups of persons without 
proper justification, in order to mitigate risks of stigmatisation 
and thus preserve traveller’s human dignity and right to equal 
treatment. This is particularly important in the light of 
religious and cultural peculiarities as outlined above. As a 
matter of fact, article 11 (3) of Directive 680/2016/EU 
prohibits any profiling which would result in a discrimination 
against the data subject. This is also being reflected in recital 
38, stating that profiling which results in discrimination 
against natural persons on the basis of personal data which are 
by their nature particularly sensitive in relation to fundamental 
rights and freedoms should be prohibited under the conditions 
laid down in Articles 21 and 52 of the CFREU [19]. 
As the increased risk that arises from profiling is inherited in 
the legal system, it also needs specific attention for developing 
computational based intelligence systems in general. 
B. Automated decision making 
Another specific aspect of computational intelligence based 
systems is the use of automated decision making processes by 
processing the data collected in the previous stage. This poses 
various legal and ethical challenges, in particular with the 
concept of equality and non-discrimination.  
From a legal point of view, the Charta of fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (CFREU) deals with equality in 
chapter III, i.e. Art. 20 - 26. Of particular importance are Art. 
20 (“Equality before the law”) and Art. 21 (Non-
discrimination) [20]. Similar to the CFREU, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits 
discrimination in Art. 14 [21]. On top of this, constitutional 
and legal traditions of the Member States must be considered 
as well, as almost all EU/EEA Members States do have 
constitutional provisions concerning equality and/or non-
discrimination. 
As described above, the ADDS developed within iBorderCtrl 
obviously and quite heavily relies on information technology 
and automatization to make certain processes more effective. 
In fact, automatization is the fundamental basis of both 
conducting interactive interviews and assessing the risk 
stemming from a traveller. This may include automatization of 
decision making/supporting processes, which as soon as actual 
human beings may be affected by such decision, raise ethical 
questions inter alia with regard not only to human dignity, but 
also to the principle of non-discrimination. To this extent, the 
set of rules inherited in any computational intelligence based 
system must not violate against the principle of non-
discrimination. The grounds outlined in article 21 CFREU 
(sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, 
age or sexual orientation) appear to be particularly relevant: 
As they are inherent properties of a person, they cannot be 
changed and offer a particularly high risk for discrimination 
[22]. Therefore, possible selectors for automated decision 
making should avoid focusing on these properties whenever 
possible. 
The basis of legal considerations regarding automated decision 
making processes in the context of iBorderCtrl is Art. 11 
Directive 680/2016/EU [23], which inherits the principles 
posed by fundamental rights as outlined above: It prohibits 
decisions bases solely on automated processing, unless 
authorised by Union or Member State law that provides 
appropriate safeguards. 
From a legal point of view, it must be re-emphasised that 
Directive 680/2016/EU (as well as Regulation 679/2016/EU 
(GDPR)) mention “profiling” and “automated decision 
making” together. However, and despite both terms overlap to 
a great extent, they are two separate things: Profiling means 
broadly speaking “gathering information about an individual 
or group of individuals and analysing their characteristics or 
behaviour patterns in order to place them into a certain 
category or group, and/or to make predictions or assessments 
about inter alia ability to carry out a certain task or individual 
interests and/or preferences [24]. In contrast to this, automated 
decision making, refers to the ability to make decisions based 
on certain information, including personal information such as 
profiles without human interaction. The difference can be seen 
in the fact that automated decision making is the process of 
coming to a decision based on an already created profile. That 
means a collection of data is used to create a profile upon 
which then an automated decision can be made; can, however, 
also be taken by a human [25]. Both techniques can be seen as 
integral parts of computational intelligence based systems. 
Hence it is to be decided, whether a system like the 
iBorderCtrl ADDS has to be seen as a system based on 
automated decision making. This would require that the 
automated decision produces adverse legal effects on the data 
subject, or  otherwise significantly affects him or her [18]. 
Clearly this would be the case, if the decision as to whether a 
certain traveller will be admitted to the Schengen areas or not 
would be reached solely via automated means, without any 
human intervention and based on information previously 
gathered. However, the iBorderCtrl ADDS does not propose 
to automate the decision whether a traveller will be admitted 
to the Schengen area or not, but rather automates the process 
to gather information from and regarding the traveller, leading 
to a risk score, which may then be taken into account by an 
actual border guard who will take the final admission or non-
admission decision. Thus, as there is no legal decision on 
entry or refusal, from a legal point of view it seems 
questionable if a respective system would be regarded as 
automated decision making within the ambit of Art. 11 
Directive 680/2016/EU.  
On the other hand, and especially from an ethical point of 
view, one may argue that the decision taken by the system 
could be seen in the allocation of the risk score itself. This is 
because Art. 11 does not only include legal decisions, but also 
any other action which might have significant effect on the 
individual [26]. This includes any objective factors which 
make the data subject to feel negatively impacted [27]. The 
risk score could or almost certainly would to some extent pre-
empt or anticipate the decision that will be taken by the border 
guard. This is because the border guard certainly will take the 
risk score into account when making the decision. If the risk 
assessment concludes that a certain traveller is a high-risk 
traveller it might be hard to imagine under what circumstances 
the border guard would overrule or differ from the automated 
risk assessment, because the data or parts thereof which led to 
a certain risk score were inaccurate or plainly false or because 
of flawed algorithms or software components. Therefore, it is 
fair to say that there is a certain risk that a border guard will 
plainly follow the assessment taken by the automatic risk 
score allocation, meaning that Art. 11 Directive 680/2016/EU 
and the included safeguards need to apply to minimise the risk 
of violations of fundamental rights. In that regard, recital 38 of 
the Directive mentions certain rights, e.g. that the data subject 
has to be informed about an automated decision making, as 
well as the right to obtain human intervention, in particular to 
express his or her point of view. Apart from that, recital 38 
state that the data subject should have the right to obtain an 
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment or to 
challenge the decision. While the right to challenge an 
automated decision could be realised quite easily, explaining 
an automated decision might be rather challenging once 
computational intelligence based learning approaches such as 
artificial neural networks are used: Due to the independency of 
the system when computing a decision and the resulting 
“black box”, it is not possible to accurately assess how exactly 
the system came to its decision, meaning that a data subject 
could not be provided with an explanation how the decision 
has been reached. This effect might also challenge the right to 
access as outlined in art. 14 of Directive 680/2016/EU, as it 
might remain unclear which categories of personal data have 
been actually considered and to which extent. One possible 
remedy in that regard could be to make at least parts of the 
algorithm transparent, or, if the algorithm is considered to be 
confidential, to inform the data subject about which categories 
of data have been (possibly) used. This solution could follow 
the overall approach applied by the Federal Court of Justice of 
Germany, which stated that an algorithm could be a trade 
secret, but that the data subject still had the right to be 
informed about which personal data is being used to compute 
a decision [28]. It has to be noted though, that this ruling did 
not consider computational intelligence based systems and the 
“black box” phenomenon, but rather algorithms in general. 
However, this approach might be rather challenging in 
practice, as from a security agency’s point of view, revealing 
any information on the functioning of an algorithm, including 
the categories of personal data which have been processed, 
might reveal confidential information about their procedures. 
In these cases, other measures have to be implemented, such 
as an ethics commission assessing the overall ethical 
implications caused by the use of such systems.  
In any case, further safeguards could include a regular quality 
assurance to ensure a fair and lawful treatment of data 
subjects. This also includes regular testing of the algorithms 
involved to ensure that they are performing as intended and do 
not produce unsound results. 
Additionally, the rights, and freedoms of the person, as 
defined in Recital 51 et seq., must be secured by appropriate 
technical and organizational measures such as applying 
pseudonymisation and anonymisation of personal data 
whenever possible. 
General recommendations for a privacy-friendly 
implementation of profiling and automated decision-making 
can be also found in the draft guidelines issued by the art. 29 
WP in the scope of regulation 679/2016/EU (GDPR) [29]. 
These guidelines should be also considered when developing 
computational intelligence based systems in general. Due to 
the fact that the GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive 
have been enacted hand-in-hand and include rather similar 
provisions on profiling and automated decision-making, many 
of the good practice recommendations [30] could be also 
applied to uses-cases falling within the scope of the Directive, 
even though that the art. 29 WP guidelines focus on the GDPR 
as a legal basis. 
C. The risk of false positives 
One of these possible violations is the issue of “false 
positives”: Results indicating that a certain condition is 
fulfilled, when in fact it is not. This could be caused by a 
variety of issues, such as flawed or equivocal rules for the risk 
calculation, misunderstandings or technical malfunctions. 
1) Definition and classification of false 
positives & false negatives in the legal 
framework 
A false positive in the scope of the ADDS means that, for 
instance, the system would indicate a hit on a person which, 
from a factual and legal point of view, would not be 
suspicious. A person would then be seen as a suspect and thus 
be harmed by negative consequences such as more intrusive 
measures (more thorough border checks) or even negative 
decisions such as a refusal. In consequence, a law-abiding 
person would not be treated as other law-abiding travellers, 
posing a discrimination against the person. While there is no 
law explicitly covering false positives and false negatives, 
legal and ethical issues can be seen in the light of fundamental 
rights and the principle of non-discrimination as outlined e.g. 
in art. 20 CFREU [31]. 
On the contrary, computational intelligence based systems 
such as the ADDS could also pose the risk of “false 
negatives”, in which a suspicious traveller would not be faced 
with appropriate checks due to a flawed risk assessment. As 
opposed to the aforementioned issue regarding false positives, 
this would objectively pose an unequal treatment as well, as 
the suspicious traveller would be treated differently as 
compared to other suspicious travellers. The impact on 
fundamental rights would be different in this scenario, though: 
In fact, the person affected by a false negative would not 
suffer from any negative consequences, meaning that this 
could not be seen as a discrimination of the affected person 
[32]. 
Last but not least, ethical concerns could arise on a broader 
scale, if the use of computational intelligence based systems 
such as ADDS would lead to less security within the Schengen 
Area, as security and physical integrity [33] are fundamental 
interests of every EU citizen as well. 
2) Ethical implications of false positives 
False positives might in addition lead to a number of ethical 
implications that have to be considered. As already explained 
above, the most obvious implication would be a discrimination 
against the traveller, who would not be treated as other law-
abiding travellers, meaning that comparable scenarios are 
treated differently.  
Apart from that, an affected person would suffer from the 
“burden of proof”, meaning that he or she would have to 
convince a border guard that the information provided by the 
ADDS was not correct. In this regard, the options of the 
traveller are probably quite limited: If certain information is, 
for instance, derived from a database or produced on the basis 
of classified information, the traveller cannot be aware of the 
actual content. Therefore, they might encounter difficulties in 
explaining why they were affected by a false positive. 
However, the iBorderCtrl system would not be used to reason 
a refusal at the border – instead, a person would have to 
undergo a thorough check, which in these cases can be seen as 
the “burden of proof”.  
From an ethical point of view, one could consider that this 
might cause issues regarding human dignity; however, as 
border guards are obliged to respect human dignity under any 
circumstances, this should normally not cause any major 
concerns. It has to be noted, though, that every interaction 
with authorities on the grounds of a false-positive brings the 
traveller in a rather uncomfortable situation, i.e. as a thorough 
check consumes time and potentially stresses a traveller. 
While there are no legal consequences affecting the travel yet, 
the false positive would cause a situation where the traveller 
would have to explain him-/herself. While a thorough check 
can neither be seen as a legal proceeding nor as a legal 
consequence affecting the travel as such, there might be 
certain overlapping aspects with the principle of the 
presumption of innocence: A traveller could feel stigmatised, 
as he or she would – from his/her point of view for no reason 
– be in this situation and would have to proof that the 
suspicions against him or her are wrong. However, as the false 
positive itself might be a reason for the border guards to 
conduct a thorough check, and as border guards – also without 
using the ADDS – would have to perform a thorough check if 
a person is suspicious from their point of view, this is not an 
issue directly stemming from the use of the ADDS system and 
therefore does not cause additional ethical issues. 
Another aspect to be considered is the fact that a thorough 
check might require a deeper look into the background of the 
traveller, therefore causing a deeper intrusion into the 
traveller’s privacy. As before, this could also happen if a 
traveller would be seen as suspicious by the border guards 
without any further input by technical systems. However, a 
well working IT-system could at least decrease the chance of 
false positives as compared to a system relying solely on 
humans. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
All in all, the use of computational intelligence based systems 
such as the ADDS component of the iBorderCtrl toolkit poses 
various legal, ethical and social challenges. While some of 
these implications are rather specific for certain use-cases, 
some general observations can be made:  
In order to ensure a lawful development and implementation 
of such systems, a close collaboration of legal and technical 
experts is crucial. The various legal and ethical implications 
arising from a particular use-case have to be identified and 
safeguards have to be implemented wherever possible. As 
computational intelligence based systems could be used in a 
variety of use-cases, the legal and ethical implications which 
arise can be quite different. However, particular challenges 
most probably occur with regard to human dignity and the 
relation of humans and machines, as well as with the principle 
of non-discrimination. These challenges might range from 
issues in the very beginning (such as social acceptance of 
human-machine interaction) to issues in the data collection 
phase (human dignity and objectification of human beings) 
and in the data processing phase (false-positives, 
stigmatisation and burden of proof).  
These rather general considerations are also reflected in the 
data protection framework: Both profiling (the automated 
processing of personal data to evaluate certain personal 
aspects relating to a natural person) and automated decision 
making (decisions made by a system purely relying on 
automated means) are subject to strict regulation, as outlined 
in Art. 22 of Regulation 679/2016/EU and Directive 
680/2016/EU. At the same time, both can be seen as crucial 
aspects of use-cases relying on computational intelligence 
based systems. Consequently, computational intelligence 
based systems have to consider a variety of safeguards to 
ensure legal compliance, such as the right to human 
intervention.  
In summary, computational intelligence based systems 
challenge the legal and ethical framework in various ways, 
making the lawful implementation of such systems rather 
complicated. Therefore, upcoming technological and legal 
developments in this field have to be closely monitored. 
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